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browsers and mobile applications with Real-Time Commu-
nications (RTC) capabilities1. Apparently, identifying one or
more of the client IP addresses via a feature of WebRTC was
ﬁrst reported and demonstrated by Roesler2 in 2015. In this
paper we refer to the WebRTC-based disclosure of a client IP
address to a visited website when using a VPN as a WebRTC
Leak.
The method due to Roesler can be used to reveal a
number of client IP addresses via JavaScript code executed
on a WebRTC-supporting browser. Private (or internal) IP
address(es) (i.e. addresses only valid in a local subnetwork)
can be extracted from the exchange of a Session Description
Protocol (SDP) object, which is necessary to establish a P2P
(peer-to-peer) connection [2], while public (or external) IP
address(es) (i.e. globally unique addresses) can be retrieved
by successfully pinging a STUN server. A STUN server
(i.e. a Session Traversal of User Datagram Protocol Through
Network Address Translators (NATs) server) allows a NAT
client to set up interactive communications, such as a phone
call, to a VoIP provider hosted outside the local network [2].
In this paper, we describe experiments performed to ex-
amine ﬁve types of client IP address that could be revealed
via the WebRTC functionality. We also examined to what
degree the choice of browser, VPN service and VPN client-
side conﬁguration affects the number and type of leaked
addresses. A related investigation has been described by Perta
et al. [3], who observed the role of the VPN service in IP
address leaks. However, they focused only on IPv6 address
leaks without looking at other types of IP address or the
role of the browser in the leaks. Moreover, the address leaks
considered are apparently not WebRTC-related. This is the ﬁrst
paper to examine all the types of IP address that could leak,
as well the ﬁrst to consider the role of the browser in these
leaks.
It is important to note that WebRTC leaks could affect client
privacy even if a VPN is not in use. This is because the client
private IP address could be leaked, a piece of information
which would not otherwise be available to a visited website
even in the absence of a VPN. However, these addresses
are not necessarily very privacy-sensitive, since clients are
typically assigned private IPv4 addresses in the 192.168.0.x
range [4].
1https://webrtc.org [accessed on 14/05/2017]
2The report and the demonstration script can be found at https://diafygi.
github.io/webrtc-ips [accessed on 24/05/2017]
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ideally, when a user connects to the Internet via a Virtual
Private Network (VPN), the IP addresses (e.g. the public IP
address) of the client device are hidden from visited websites.
If a user is using a VPN for anonymity reasons, then revealing
one, or more, of their IP addresses to a visited website or
any browser add-on that can execute JavaScript on the client’s
browser is likely to negate the purpose of VPN use. Revealing
client IP address(es) could enable tracking and/or identiﬁcation
of the client. Moreover, by using geolocation lookup, a client’s
public IP address could disclose its country and city [1].
The introduction of WebRTC to modern web browsers has
created a new and simple method for a visited website to
discover one or more of the client IP addresses. WebRTC
is a set of APIs and communications protocols that provide
2The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
section 2 we discuss the types of IP address that could poten-
tially be leaked via WebRTC. We review prior work related
to WebRTC leaks in section 3. The research methodology
employed as well as details of the experiments performed are
discussed in sections 4 and 5. In section 6, we report on and
analyse the results of these experiments. Before concluding in
section 8, we discuss WebRTC leak countermeasures in section
7.
II. IP ADDRESSES AT RISK
In the experiments (see Section 5) we found that WebRTC
functionality can be exploited to reveal one or more of ﬁve
types of client IP address, as listed below. Note that the public
IPv4 address of a client is not in the list, as in the experiments
we performed we were never able to learn such an address
using WebRTC.
• Public IPv6 address: this is the IPv6 address of the
platform and is typically assigned by the ISP of the client.
• Public Temporary IPv6 address: this address is assigned
by the network to which the client platform is attached.
• Unique local address (ULA) assigned by LAN: this IPv6
address is assigned by the network to which the client
platform is attached, and is the approximate IPv6 coun-
terpart of the Private IPv4 address assigned by LAN [5].
• Private IP address assigned by the VPN server: this pri-
vate (IPv4 or IPv6, depending on the VPN conﬁguration)
address is assigned by the VPN server.
• Private IPv4 address assigned by LAN: this address is
assigned by the network to which the client platform is
attached.
The disclosure of an IPv6 address is more privacy-damaging
than that of the private IPv4 address. Moreover, the Public
IPv6 address remained the same throughout more than two
months of testing while the temporary IPv6 address changed
with every connection instance. However, the persistence of an
IP address depends on the client and network conﬁguration,
but there is no doubt that the public IPv6 address is more
persistent than a temporary IPv6 address (hence the name
temporary).
More generally, the degree to which the disclosure of a
particular type of IP address degrades user privacy depends
on its uniqueness and persistence. For example, a private IPv4
address (4 bytes) is typically in the 192.168.0.x range, and
is thus far less privacy-sensitive than a public IPv6 address
(16 bytes). Moreover, a leak of the IP addresses of clients
that are assigned static (i.e. ﬁxed) IP addresses will be more
privacy-compromising than if these addresses are dynamically
assigned (i.e. they change regularly).
III. PREVIOUS WORK
WebRTC leaks have been discussed in several previous
studies [2], [3], [4], [6], [7], [8]. Jakobsson [7] explores
WebRTC leaks in the greatest depth, but focuses only on public
IP address leaks.
Alaca et al. [4] observed that WebRTC features could enable
a visited website to learn the IP addresses assigned to all the
network interfaces of a client platform, including the private IP
addresses assigned by a VPN. They deemed this possibility to
be a medium-level threat, which seems a reasonable evaluation
given they only observed the possibility of private IP address
leaks. However, they state in their evaluation that the WebRTC
leak issue requires further study.
Englehardt et al. [6] consider the WebRTC threat in some
depth, but like many other authors they only examine private
IP address leaks. Liu et al. [8] only examine leaking of
private IP addresses. They also claim that the WebRTC issue
is only applicable to Chrome and Firefox, but it is not clear
what browsers and which versions they tested (the results we
obtained, described in Section V, contradict this claim).
Hosoi et al. [2] point out that public IP addresses could be
amongst those leaked. As previously mentioned, Perta et al.
[3] explore IPv6 address leaks in detail. They report on the
results of IP address leak tests of 14 VPN services; however,
they do not describe the role of WebRTC in these leaks.
A recent draft RFC, entitled WebRTC IP Address Handling
Requirements [9], details browser mechanisms that can poten-
tially prevent WebRTC-related IP address leaks.
In summary, a number of authors have examined the We-
bRTC issue, but none have made a comprehensive survey of
the issue; typically they have either only examined some of
the possible IP addresses that can be leaked, or not considered
the roles of both the browser and the VPN service in affecting
the magnitude of the leaks. In the remainder of this paper
we describe the results of the ﬁrst comprehensive study of
the WebRTC leak issue, including examining the roles of the
browser, VPN service and VPN conﬁguration in affecting the
nature and volume of IP addresses leaked. This enables us
to make recommendations to end users on how they might
optimise their behaviour to minimise their loss of privacy. We
have also provided a website which enables users to test the
privacy properties of their own current conﬁgurations.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
We used a modiﬁed version of Roesler’s publicly available
JavaScript to perform the experiments. The modiﬁcation incor-
porates some of the features provided by BrowserLeaks.com
that enable the script to work with Edge, which Roesler’s
original script does not support. Preliminary tests revealed
that the number and type of leaked addresses are affected by
the choices for both the web browser and the VPN service.
We therefore tested ﬁve different widely used VPN services
running on eight different browser-OS combinations, namely
four browsers each running on Windows and macOS. Since we
had no access to any publicly available information regarding
the VPN services that are most widely used, we informally
selected ﬁve of the top search results in Google. The VPN
services we chose to examine are: Hide My A**! (HMA!),
ZenMate, ExpressVPN, VyprVPN and TorGuard. Full details
of the OSs and VPNs used in the experiments can be found
in Appendix A.
For browsers, we chose to examine the ﬁve most widely
used desktop programs according to netmarketshare.com3,
3https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on
14/05/2017]
3namely Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari and Opera. Although
Internet Explorer is the second most widely used browser,
we excluded it from the study because it does not support
WebRTC and so is not affected by the leaks discussed in
this paper. Moreover, it has been replaced by Edge as the
default browser in Windows. Since Chrome, Firefox and Opera
are available on Windows and macOS, we tested these three
browsers on both OSs.
Most of the tested VPN programs provide means for the
users to modify some VPN conﬁgurations to, for example,
switch from one VPN protocol (e.g. L2TP) to another (e.g.
PPTP). We found that in some cases this also affects which IP
addresses are leaked. This is likely to be due to the VPN server
conﬁguration rather than the protocol itself. Nevertheless,
this fact is important to recognize and so we indicate in
our results summary below the VPN programs that exhibited
such differences (see Appendix A for details of tested VPN
conﬁgurations).
V. DETAILS OF EXPERIMENTS
To perform the experiments, a website (https:
//ﬁngerprintable.org/webrtcleaks) was specially established.
The web page contains JavaScript that, when executed in a
client browser, fetches all the IP addresses it can retrieve
using WebRTC; the leaked IP addresses (if any) are then
displayed on the page (see Figure 1). When using it for the
tests, the visiting device used either the Windows ipconﬁg
command at the command prompt, or ifconﬁg in macOS
terminal to identify the types of address displayed on the
page.
Fig. 1. WebRTC leak detector
We deployed all ﬁve of the chosen VPN programs with each
of the eight selected browser-OS combinations, giving a total
of 40 test cases. In each case, we caused the client to visit the
test page on the specially established website, and documented
the IP address(es) displayed. For each of the 40 (VPN, OS,
browser) combinations, we visited the test page using all the
protocols/conﬁgurations supported by the VPN to detect any
differences in leaked IP addresses, i.e. for each of the 40 test
cases we made between one and ﬁve tests (for full details see
Appendix B), giving a total of 116 tests. For example, for
each browser-OS combination we visited the test page using
VyprVPN a number of times, once using L2TP/IPsec once
using PPTP, and so on.
The tested VPN services provide access to VPN servers in
a range of countries. However, in a series of informal tests we
found no difference in the set of leaked IP addresses when
connecting to VPN servers for the same service in different
countries.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Tables I and II summarize the experimental results for
Windows and macOS, respectively. Listed in the tables are
the types of IP addresses leaked in each test environment. The
VPN protocols are also given in the cases where the choice of
protocol made a difference to the set of leaked IP addresses.
It is worth noting that tests on macOS while deploying a VPN
did not reveal a client private IPv4 address, public IPv6 address
or ULA.
A. VPNs
The choice of VPN service had a signiﬁcant effect on
the number and type of IP addresses leaked. In some cases,
using one VPN protocol (e.g. L2TP/IPsec) in a VPN program
leaked a different number of addresses than another protocol
in the application. We observed no differences in address
leakage when switching between the TCP and UDP network
protocols, in VPN services that enabled such options for users.
However, when testing different VPN programs, variations in
the sets of leaked IP addresses were observed even when
the same protocol was in use. We therefore concluded that
these differences can be attributed to how the VPN service
is conﬁgured to handle the connection when using particular
protocols.
As can be seen from the tables, TorGuard proved to be the
least privacy-compromising VPN service. In all test cases, it
revealed none of the client’s public IP addresses. At the other
extreme, VyprVPN and ExpressVPN did not prevent any of
the WebRTC leaks.
B. Browsers
Safari revealed no IP addresses, and this is almost certainly
because its WebRTC-support remains under development. This
is clear from the Safari browser engine (namely webkit)
speciﬁcations status page4. By contrast, Edge revealed four
of the ﬁve IP addresses discussed in this paper (only the
temporary IPv6 address was not leaked). Edge was the only
browser to reveal the public IPv6 address(es) and ULA(s). This
makes it the most privacy-damaging browser. This might be
because at the present Edge is the only browser that supports
the next generation WebRTC API, named ORTC (Object Real-
Time Communications)5.
Opera and Chrome were identical in terms of the number
and type of leaked addresses. This is likely because both are
based on Google’s open-source browser project, Chromium6.
In all the individual tests that resulted in IP address leakage,
they both revealed the temporary IPv6 address and either
the local private IP address or the VPN-assigned private
4https://webkit.org/status/ [accessed on 14/05/2017]
5https://ortc.org/faq [accessed 14/05/2017]
6 http://www.chromium.org/blink/developer-faq [accessed on 14/05/2017]
4TABLE I
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS ON WINDOWS
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Edge Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 pvt. IPv4 pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA pvt. IPv4 - IPv6
HMA! (all protocols) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 - pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA VPN IPv4
ZenMate VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 - pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (all protocols) VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 - pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA VPN IPv4; temp. IPv6
VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6
VyprVPN (L2TP/IPsec & PPTP) temp. IPv6 no leak pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 - ULA temp. IPv6
TorGuard (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 pvt. IPv4 - VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4
TorGuard (OpenConnect) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
IPv6 = public IPv6 address; temp. IPv6 = public temporary IPv6 address; ULA = unique local address; VPN IPv4 = private IP address assigned by VPN
server; pvt. IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by LAN.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS ON MACOS
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Safari Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4 - IPv6 pvt. IPv4 no leak pvt. IPv4 - IPv6
HMA! (PPTP) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
HMA! (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6
ZenMate VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4 - temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (L2TP/IPsec) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (L2TP/IPsec) no leak no leak no leak no leak
TorGuard (all protocols) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6 = public temporary IPv6 address; VPN IPv4 = private IP address assigned by VPN server; pvt. IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by
LAN.
IP address. Somewhat different behaviour was exhibited by
Firefox, which in most cases revealed either the local private
IP address or the VPN-assigned private IP address; in some
cases it did not reveal any addresses.
Firefox was the least privacy-damaging of the Windows-
based browsers and Edge the most. In macOS, Safari revealed
no IP addresses and so it is the least privacy-damaging.
Chrome and Opera were the most privacy-damaging macOS
browsers.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
The main lesson from the experiments described in this
paper is that users concerned about IP address leaks should
select their browser and VPN service with care, perhaps using
the https://ﬁngerprintable.org/webcrtleaks site to check the
properties of the chosen combination. Over and above this,
users interested in maintaining their privacy by preventing We-
bRTC leaks can perform one or more of the countermeasures
discussed below. In this context, the ﬁrst countermeasure has
previously been discussed by Hosoi et al. [2] and the second
countermeasure by Perta et al. [3].
It is worth noting that disabling JavaScript would prevent
WebRTC leaks but would also disable many features and
functionality of modern websites. Most users are likely to ﬁnd
this an unacceptably high cost for the privacy enhancement
they would receive, in the same way that whilst disabling
cookies has signiﬁcant privacy beneﬁts, the usability impact
is too great to make it a widely used protection measure.
• Disable WebRTC Disabling WebRTC in a browser
would prevent all of the leaks discussed in this paper.
Typically, this countermeasure can be implemented via
the browser user settings. However, such an approach
may not be acceptable to all users, since it will disable
all the functionality provided by WebRTC.
• Disable IPv6 Of course, disabling IPv6 addressing in a
client computer means there are no IPv6 addresses (both
regular and temporary) or ULA to be leaked. Private IPv4
address(es) can still be leaked but they are much less
privacy-compromising than the other addresses.
• Anonymizing add-ons Browser add-ons are available
that block leakage of client addresses. For example,
Chrome has an ofﬁcial add-on called WebRTC Network
Limiter7 that prevents WebRTC leaks. However, as stated
in the add-on menu, using the add-on could negatively
affect WebRTC features.
• Browser choice As demonstrated in this paper the choice
of browser makes a signiﬁcant difference to the type and
number of leaked IP addresses. A user can check their
browser of choice by visiting the test page to discover if
IP addresses are leaked when using a VPN.
• VPN choice As demonstrated in this paper, WebRTC
leaks also depend on the VPN in use and its conﬁguration.
A user can test their VPN of choice for WebRTC leaks to
help decide whether or not it meets their privacy needs.
Again, this can be performed by visiting the test web page
and checking if any leaked IP addresses are displayed.
7https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/webrtc-network-limiter/
npeicpdbkakmehahjeeohfdhnlpdklia
5VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the experiments performed in this study, Safari did not
cause any client IP addresses to be leaked via WebRTC leaks.
Edge, on the other hand, proved to be the most privacy-
damaging in this respect. However, regardless of the user
browser choice, we found that some VPN implementations
prevent leakage of client public IP address(es). Moreover, in
some cases, selecting an appropriate client VPN conﬁguration
fully or partially prevented WebRTC leaks.
The experiments we performed in this study explored an
aspect of WebRTC leaks that has not been addressed in previ-
ous work, namely that the choice of browser and VPN service
makes a signiﬁcant difference to the extend of WebRTC
leaks. The results will help users decide on best practices to
minimize the risk of WebRTC leaks. We also hope it will
encourage VPN and browser providers to work on mitigating
the privacy-compromising properties of their implementations
of the WebRTC API.
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APPENDIX A
PROGRAM VERSIONS
A. Operating Systems
The following OSs were used in the experiments.
• Windows 10.0.14393 (Build 14393)
• macOS 10.12.4 (16E195)
B. VPN Programs
The VPN program versions and URLs that were tested are
listed below.
TABLE III
VPN PROGRAM VERSIONS
VPN / Specs Windows MacOS URL
HMA! 3.4.6.1 2.2.7.0 https://hidemyass.com
ZenMate 3.4.7.17 1.5.4 https://zenmate.com
ExpressVPN 6.0.9 6.3.3 https://expressvpn.com
VyprVPN 2.9.6.7227 2.14.0.5485 https://goldenfrog.com/vyprvpn
TorGuard 0.3.69 0.3.69 https://torguard.net
C. Browsers
Listed below are the names and versions of browsers used
in the experiments. The version numbers are the same on both
Windows and MacOS.
• Chrome 58.0.3029.110
• Firefox 53.0.2
• Edge 38.14393.1066.0
• Opera 45.0.2552.635
• Safari 10.1 (12603.1.30.0.34)
APPENDIX B
TESTED VPN CONFIGURATIONS
Table IV contains the VPN conﬁgurations and protocols
deployed in our experiments.
TABLE IV
TESTED VPN PROGRAM CONFIGURATIONS
OS / VPN HMA! ZenMate ExpressVPN VyprVPN TorGuard
Windows OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
N/A OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
L2TP/IPsec
PPTP
SSTP
Chameleon*
OpenVPN
L2TP/IPsec
PPTP
OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
OpenConnect UDP
OpenConnect TCP
macOS OpenVPN
PPTP
N/A OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
L2TP/IPsec
Chameleon*
OpenVPN
L2TP/IPsec
OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
OpenConnect UDP
OpenConnect TCP
*VyprVPN proprietary protocol
